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PARTY AUTONOMY AND CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION IN CONFLICT: A “TROJAN 
HORSE” IN THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 
THE E.U. ADR-DIRECTIVE 2013/11? 
Norbert Reich† 
ABSTRACT 
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to controversy in many jurisdictions; 
recent U.S. and Canadian Supreme Court case law have been used as examples. European 
Union (E.U.) law, which originally excluded arbitration in general from the Brussels/Rome 
regimes, has recently taken a mixed, and to some extent limited, approach by including 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) entities “imposing” a solution in its recent ADR 
Directive 2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop consumer arbitration 
schemes in E.U. Member States as a second route to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new 
and somewhat clandestine policy of the E.U. The paper insists on some additional procedural 
guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become more popular among Member countries, 
even though Dir. 2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on “specific 
acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such additional protection is in Article 47 
of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, viewed together with Article 19(1) para. 2 of the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) whereby “Member States shall “provide remedies 
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. At the time of 
writing, the implementation measures of Member States concerning Dir. 2013/11 have to be 
awaited before making any final judgment as to their conformity with E.U. law and efficiency. 
The paper seeks to provide some guidelines for this coming debate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses an important new development in conflict 
regulation between consumers and businesses in the E.U.—a subject 
matter which has kept me busy for some time. This paper will address 
the question of how a regime of extra-legal conflict management by 
ADR mechanisms, which are based on voluntary cooperation between 
consumers and traders, supplements, but does not replace, judicial 
court proceedings. This paper argues that a more intrusive regime to 
solve consumer complaints by binding arbitration will become 
increasingly popular. Justice will be more or less privatized under an 
efficiency rhetoric, which criticizes lengthy, costly, and highly 
discretionary court proceedings that exist in many Member States to 
the detriment of consumers and the working of justice in general. For 
many legal scholars, binding arbitration based on contractual 
agreements is regarded as an alternative; however, it is not always clear 
what the legal and consumer policy costs of an extension of ADR 
mechanisms are, and whether there is a fair balance between the 
supposed efficiency gains on the one hand and the requirements of 
effective legal protection on the other. 
The paper will proceed as follows. First, it will give an overview 
of liberal and mixed regimes concerning the promotion of binding 
consumer arbitration, namely in the United States (Section I) and 
Canada (Section II) where the legitimacy and limits of consumer 
arbitration have been subject to controversial Supreme Court 
judgments. These judgments show the complexity of this issue and 
provide insight into future E.U. developments of ADR mechanisms in 
E.U. countries. Section III will analyze new trends in E.U. law 
provoked by the recently adopted ADR Directive 2013/11/EU,1 
                                                 
1   Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes 2013, 2014 
O.J. (L 165/63) [hereinafter Directive 2013/11]. See Horst Eidenmüller & Martin 
Engel, Die Schlichtungsfalle: Verbraucherrechtsdurchsetzung nach der ADR-Richtlinie und 
ODR-Verordnung der EU, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT  1704 (2013) for a 
critical appreciation of those who are not concerned with consumer arbitration 
specifically, but who fear not without justification a de facto denial of justice to 
consumers even if they take proceedings with a non-binding outcome; it is unrealistic 
to expect consumers to pursue their claim if rejected by the ADR-entity before courts 
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where consumer arbitration has found a place of its own in regulating 
ADR-entities “imposing solutions” on consumers. Section IV 
concerns the scope of application of Dir. 2013/11. Section V examines 
prior E.U. law in the form of two important, and in the opinion of this 
author, still valid precedents set by the Court of Justice of the E.U. 
(CJEU, then called ECJ), namely Claro2 and Asturcom.3 Sections VI 
through X propose some standards on valid consumer arbitration by 
reference to Dir. 2013/11 and other E.U. law instruments. These 
standards are then measured under a fundamental rights perspective 
contained in Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19(1)(a) Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU), namely the principle of effective 
judicial protection of rights granted to consumers under E.U. law.4 
Then, Section XI argues that these standards limit party-autonomy 
with regard to binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and 
require the adoption of additional mechanisms to curb an eventual 
abuse of arbitration clauses by traders or trade associations. Finally, 
Sections XII through XVII examine E.U. countries that must adapt 
their arbitration legislation to new E.U. standards. Some preliminary 
conclusions will follow. 
                                                 
of law. The authors also question the legal basis of Article 114 of the Directive, 
although such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2   Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R. 
I-10421; see also Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 41. 
3   Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera, 
2009 E.C.R. I-9579 ¶ 54-55. See Jules Stuyck, Note to Pannon and Asturcom, 47 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 879 (2010); Christopher Hodges, Consumer Protection and 
Procedural Justice, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF 
JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyn Terryn et al. ed. 2013); Chantal Mak, Judgment of the Court 
(First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez 
Nogueira, Case C-40/08, Commentary, 6 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 437 (2010); Martin 
Ebers, ECJ (First Chamber) 6 October 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones 
SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira – From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory Consumer Law, 
Ex Officio Application of European Union Law and Res Judicata 18 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L. 
823 (2010). See also ALEXANDER J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, B2C ARBITRATION: CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN ARBITRATION 7, 117, 133 (2012). 
4   See NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU CIVIL LAW ch. IV 
(2014). 
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I. A LIBERAL APPROACH: ADR IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the words of the Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 “declared a national policy favoring 
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial 
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed 
to resolve by arbitration.”6 U.S. law generally takes a very liberal view 
toward arbitration clauses without making a distinction between 
commercial and consumer arbitration.7 This view was confirmed in the 
Court’s controversial decision of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph.8  
In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, Larketta Randolph signed a 
financing agreement for the purchase of a mobile home with Green 
Tree Financial. The agreement bound any disputes arising from the 
agreement to arbitration. When Randolf sued Green Tree for violating 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the district court compelled 
arbitration. However, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit overturned the 
district court’s decision, finding that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable because the steep arbitration costs would negatively 
affect Randolph’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights. The Supreme 
Court disagreed and held that consumers bear the burden to prove that 
the arbitral forum is financially inaccessible to them.9 This opinion was 
challenged by a strong dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, 
and Breyer (in part), who argued that, “as a repeat player in the 
arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has superior 
information about the costs to consumers of pursuing arbitration.”10 
This approach by the Supreme Court means that ADR mechanisms in 
favor of consumers can easily be avoided by arbitration clauses entered 
into by standard form contracts with consumers as in Green Tree. 
Recent state court cases, however, show a somewhat more 
nuanced approach toward arbitration clauses. For example, Comb v. 
                                                 
5   The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2014) [hereinafter FAA]. 
6   Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
7  LARS WEIHE, DER SCHUTZ DER VERBRAUCHER IM RECHT DER 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 116, 205-06 (2005) (for a critique from a consumer 
policy point of view with regard to “informed consent”). 
8   Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
9   Id. at 92. 
10   Id. at 96. 
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Paypal11 concerned a class action against an electronic disbursement 
service alleging illegal removal of funds.12 The defendant, Paypal, 
argued that the case should have been submitted to arbitration because 
the contract contained an arbitration clause.13 The District Court held 
that, despite its wide use and recognition in relevant California law, the 
arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable for several 
reasons.14 First, there was a lack of mutuality whereby arbitration was 
imposed on the weaker party while the stronger party was allowed the 
choice of forum.15 Second, the clause contained a prohibition against 
consolidation of claims.16 Third, the costs of arbitration and venue 
were unconscionable because the “place or manner” in which 
arbitration was to occur unreasonably took into account “the 
respective circumstances of the parties.”17 
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems18 concerned an action for false 
advertising and deceptive business practices of the defendant 
PacifiCare for inducing persons to subscribe to health plans.19 
PacifiCare claimed that the plaintiff, who obtained health coverage 
through his employer, was required to arbitrate his claim because of 
the subscriber agreement between PacifiCare and the plaintiff’s 
employer.20 The California Supreme Court held that the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable.21 The Court’s reasoning was similar to the 
decision in Comb, at least insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, but 
not with regard to restitution and unjust enrichment. Therefore, in 
California, claims for unjust enrichment are arbitrable, while claims for 
injunctions against deceptive advertising practices are not arbitrable 
because they are undertaken “in the public benefit.” 
                                                 
11   Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
12   Id. at 1166. 
13   Id. at 1169-70. 
14   Id. at 1172. 
15   Id. at 1173-75. 
16   Id. at 1175-76. 
17   Id. at 1177 (quoting Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 
894-95 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
18   Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003). 
19   Id. at 1159. 
20   Id. at 1160. 
21   See generally id. 
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The Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing Corp. v. Cardegna 
seemed unconcerned by attempts to limit the effects of arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts.22 The litigation in Cardegna concerned a 
class action suit brought against usurious terms in a consumer credit 
agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.23 The case was an 
appeal from a decision by the Florida Supreme Court, which set aside 
the arbitration clause.24 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that to 
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful 
“could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but 
is criminal in nature  . . .”25 The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court and distinguished two causes in 
which arbitration clauses can be challenged in court: 
1) The arbitration clause is unlawful as such; and 
2) The entire contract from which the arbitration 
clause cannot be severed is invalid, which was not 
the case in a usurious credit agreement. 
The Supreme Court held that, “regardless of whether the challenge is 
brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the 
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must 
go to the arbitrator.”26 
Consumer protection depends on the willingness of arbitrators 
to apply and enforce consumer protection provisions in particular of 
state law. Arbitration awards, however, are not published, and 
therefore are not subject to critical public and academic debate. It 
seems that there is no remedy under U.S. law against an arbitration 
award disregarding mandatory consumer protection provisions, unless 
the consumer can prove the existence of the narrow defenses 
                                                 
22   See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2006). 
23   Id. at 442-43. 
24   Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 
2005). 
25   Id. (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
26   Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 449. 
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enumerated in the 1958 New York Convention.27 Arbitration clauses 
have become a prominent and popular instrument to avoid the 
application of consumer protection provisions, at least in contract 
litigation between business and consumers, and particularly in class 
action suits. 
An arbitration clause may be considered “substantially 
unconscionable,” as in the Pennsylvania case of Bragg v. Linden 
Research,28 if an arbitration clause is either one-sided or non-
transparent, or if there are additional costs to the consumer to 
arbitrate. 
In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court addressed the 
relationship between arbitration clauses in cellular telephone contracts 
between respondents (the Concepcions) and petitioner (AT&T) and 
the prohibition of classwide arbitration.29 After the Concepcions were 
charged sales taxes on the retail value of phones provided free under 
their service contract, they sued AT&T in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was 
consolidated with a class action alleging, inter alia, that AT&T had 
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on “free 
phones”. The Supreme Court in rejecting the consolidation claim took 
the opposite view of the California Supreme Court,30 which had ruled 
that consumers must have the right to proceed with a class action and 
shall not be forced into arbitration. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, framed AT&T as a clash of two policies, namely, the policy 
                                                 
27   Defenses under the convention include: lack of proper notice, 
arbitration decision contrary to public policy of the forum country, manifest 
disregard of the law. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention], 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.ht
ml. 
28   Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
See GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF THE ONLINE WORLDS 
95 (2010) for a discussion of U.S. practice on enforcing contractual provisions 
containing an arbitration clause where the Bragg decision was found to be “rather 
surprising (to many legal commentators) and presume that other courts looking at 
the contracts of other virtual words will be more likely to find them enforceable.”. 
29   See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
30   Discover Bank v Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
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of California courts favoring consumers’ decision to opt for class 
actions, and the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration. The Supreme 
Court held that the FAA preempts the state court class action rule, so 
the dispute must be submitted to arbitration and shall not proceed as 
a class action.31 In his dissent, Justice Breyer insisted that, due to the 
small amount of the individual claim ($30.22), a denial of class actions 
practically means a denial of justice. This argument was rejected by the 
majority, who reasoned that class actions in arbitration proceedings are 
not useful and manageable remedies. As Justice Scalia said: “Requiring 
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with 
the FAA.” 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, decided by the Supreme 
Court on June 20, 2013, concerned an arbitration clause that 
disallowed anti-trust claims to be brought by a class.32 Again, the 
Court’s majority reiterated its liberal view favoring arbitration as a 
“matter of contract,” even against mandatory provisions of federal 
anti-trust laws. Justice Kagan’s dissent, in my opinion, correctly insists 
on the “effective vindication” rule established in prior case law, which 
limits arbitration clauses where they effectively prevent enforcement 
of “congressionally created rights.”33 This is accomplished by 
arbitration clauses that de facto prevent compensation of anti-trust 
claims and undermine the deterrent effect of compensation for anti-
trust infringements. 
The case law of the Supreme Court limits effective consumer 
protection as provided by federal (anti-trust) and state law (the 
California Discover Bank rule34). The Court also seems to contradict 
the plain meaning of section 2 of the FAA, which reads: 
[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and 
                                                 
31   Id. at 1750-51. 
32   Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).  
33   Id. at 2313. 
34   Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100. 
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
equity for the revocation of any contract.35 
Therefore, the FAA would seem to allow limits to arbitration 
in consumer (and commercial) matters based on defenses such as 
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and mandatory (federal and/or state) 
law, which was in part developed by state courts but had been regarded 
with hostility by the Supreme Court majority. This practice creates, as 
the dissent in American Express pointed out, areas of de facto 
immunity from law: “[the FAA] reflects a federal policy favoring actual 
arbitration—that is, arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of revolving 
disputes,’ not as a foolproof way of killing off valid claims.”36 However, 
the Supreme Court’s message in American Express is unequivocal: 
courts are required to enforce arbitration agreements, including class 
action waivers, in accordance with their terms. 
Legal practitioners and scholars have criticized the Supreme 
Court’s liberal view on arbitration as an “excessive use” of arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts.37 The disadvantages of excessive use of 
arbitration for consumers seem to outweigh the advantages of 
arbitration for service and goods providers, namely: 
 no possibility of a rational decision for or against 
arbitration before the dispute arises; 
                                                 
35   FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2014). 
36   Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2315. 
37   See WEIHE, supra note 8, at 43-45; Richard M. Alderman, The Future of 
Consumer Law in the United States – Hello Arbitration, Bye-Bye Courts, So-Long Consumer 
Protection (Univ. Hous. L. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-A-09, 2007); Richard M. 
Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1 
(2003); Gerhard Wagner, Dispute Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Justice 
Systems, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 347, 394 (Horst Eidenmüller ed. 2013). With regard to then existing 
smalls claims procedures, see NORBERT REICH, STAATLICHE REGULIERUNG 
ZWISCHEN MARKTVERSAGEN UND POLITIKVERSAGEN 129 (1988). See also GRALF-
PETER CALLIESS, GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGE 308-14 
(2006) (providing a critical view (without citing the harsh case law of the U.S. 
Supreme Court)). 
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 the trader can always amend the arbitration clause 
unilaterally; 
 no legal representation, no class actions, limited 
possibilities for bringing evidence, no legal dispute 
insurance; 
 arbitrators cannot be formally obliged to apply 
state consumer protection legislation;38 
 only limited access to documents (which are 
usually in the hand of the trader), no pre-trial 
discovery procedure; 
 no jury, only limited appeal possibilities; 
 frequently excessive costs, compared with existing 
small claims procedures; and 
 the place of arbitration may be geographically 
distant from residence of consumer. 
II. A MIXED APPROACH: ADR IN CANADA 
In terms of Canadian law on arbitration, a lively discussion 
existed among scholars in Canada on whether pre-contractual 
arbitration clauses could be enforced in consumer contracts, and 
whether they could eventually be used to avoid class actions similar to 
the United States.39 
                                                 
38   The American Arbitration Association (AAA) Consumer Due Process 
Protocol contains such an obligation, while the rules of the ICC (International 
Chamber of Commerce) are silent on that point. CALLIESS, supra note 39, at 359. 
39   See Shelley McGill, The Conflict between Consumer Class Actions and 
Contractual Arbitration Clauses, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 359 (2006); Jonnette Watson 
Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL 
L.J. 693 (2006). But see David T. Neave & Jennifer M. Spencer, Class Proceedings: The 
New Way to Trump Mandatory Arbitration Clauses?, 63 THE ADVOCATE 495 (2005) 
(favoring of the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, according to the 
U.S. model which is said to strike the “right balance”). 
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In Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, the Canadian 
Supreme Court held that arbitration clauses in an electronic consumer 
contract for the purchase of computers from a U.S. company by a 
citizen of Quebec were also enforceable40 against a class action brought 
by the Quebec “Union des consommateurs”. The Court reasoned that 
the consumer had access to the arbitration clause via a hyperlink on 
the website of the company, and that he agreed to be bound by the 
clause when he clicked on the link.41 The Court also reasoned that “the 
clause was no more difficult for the consumer to access than would 
have been the case had he or she been given a paper copy of the entire 
contract on which the terms and conditions of sale appeared on the 
back of the first page.”42 Further, the Court stated that any challenge 
to the arbitration agreement must be resolved first by the arbitrator 
who has Kompetenz-Kompetenz under international agreements and 
Canadian law.43 This doctrine is a traditional doctrine in (commercial) 
arbitration under which the arbitrator, and not a court of law, has the 
“competence-competence,” or the final say over the legality of 
arbitration proceedings, including the choice of the arbitrator.44  
The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority, arguing that 
the arbitration and jurisdiction clauses, which are, according the 
Quebec law, forbidden, are similar if they refer the consumer case to a 
non-Quebec authority. This is the case with the reference to the U.S. 
arbitrator as foreseen in the contract clause; the arbitration clause is 
therefore unenforceable. 
A more recent case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court, 
Seidel v. TELUS, seems to take a more critical view on arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts aimed at excluding class action 
proceedings against the supplier of cellular telephone services.45 In 
                                                 
40   Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
801 (Can.). 
41   Id. 
42   Id. 
43   Id. 
    44 Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA, 
1991 E.C.R. I-3855 (expressly finding that the arbitrator had this authority); see 
Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln in Grenzüberschreitenden 
Börsentermingeschäften, 12 Z. Eur. Pro. 981 (1996). 
45  Seidel v. TELUS Commc'ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.); Shelley 
McGill, Consumer Arbitration After Seidel v. TELUS, 51(2) CAN. BUS. L.J. 187 (2011). 
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Seidel, the contract contained a clause with the supplier referring 
disputes to “private and confidential arbitration,” as well as a waiver 
by the consumer of the right to pursue a class action claim.46 Among 
the questions before the Supreme Court were whether this clause was 
unconscionable under the British Columbia Business Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA), and whether the waiver was in 
conformity with section 3 of the BPCPA, which provides: “Any waiver 
or release by a person of the person’s rights, benefits or protections 
under this Act is void except to the extent that the waiver or release is 
expressly permitted by this Act.”47 
One of the questions before the Court was whether this 
prohibition had to be enforced by the arbitrator under the Canadian 
(and U.S.) Kompetenz-Kompetenz rule, or whether it could also be 
enforced by a court of law. The majority relied on section 172 of the 
BPCPA, which allows any person without “a special interest” to bring 
a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief.48 The plaintiff in 
Seidel relied on this provision for her action against TELUS to avoid 
the arbitration clause and class action waiver. In interpreting the scope 
of section 172, the majority—against a strong dissenting opinion 
defending traditional principles of arbitration law—relied on the 
objective of the BPCPA, which is to confer consumer protection and 
enhance consumers’ access to justice.49 This objective implicitly limits 
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle at least with regard to declaratory and 
injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court held that the class action waiver 
was dependent on the (annulled) arbitration clause; it could not be 
separated from it and could not exist without a valid arbitration 
clause.50 The decision, however, made no reference to compensation 
or restitution where section 172 (3) is applicable only to a much more 
limited extent.  
                                                 
46   Id. ¶ 44. 
47  Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2 
(Can.). 
48  Id. § 172. The BPCPA also seems to contain broad standing provisions 
not dependent on the violated rights.  
49   Seidel, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531. 
50    Id. ¶ 46. 
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III. TO “PROPOSE” OR “IMPOSE” A SOLUTION: THE QUESTION OF 
E.U. LAW 
EU Dir. 2013/11 provides for a two-tier mechanism for the 
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, which are described in 
Art. 2(1): 
This Directive shall apply to procedures for the out-of-
court resolution of domestic and cross-border disputes 
concerning contractual obligations stemming from 
sales contracts and service contracts between a trader 
established in the Union and a consumer resident in 
the Union through the intervention of an ADR-entity 
which proposes or imposes a solution or brings the 
parties together with the aim of facilitating an amicable 
solution.51 
“Propose” and “impose” are nearly identical terms, so they 
likely went nearly unnoticed in the (scant) debate of the Commission 
proposal of 20 November 2011 on the Directive,52 which was adopted 
in the record time of little more than one and a half years. Both 
elements of the proposal and the final Directive were based on the 
internal market provision of Article 11453 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The question of the 
correct legal basis will be further discussed in Section XII. 
However, to “propose” a solution is quite different than to 
“impose” a solution. “Proposing” a solution is in line with the earlier 
initiatives by the Commission, which were based on 
Recommendations 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 and 2001/310/EC 
                                                 
51    Directive 2013/11, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
52  Commission Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution for Consumer Disputes, COM (2011) 793 final (Nov. 20, 2011). 
53   Art. 114 (1) TFEU gives the European Union jurisdiction “to adopt 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
or functioning of the internal market.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 114 (1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
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of 4 April 2001.54 These Recommendations were not applicable to 
entities who tried to “impose” a solution on consumers, e.g., binding 
consumer arbitration. In contrast, arbitration, including consumer 
arbitration, was expressly excluded from the scope of E.U. instruments 
concerning jurisdiction (Art. 1(2)(d) Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 and 
now Art. 1(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012.55 and applicable 
law (Art. 1(2)(e) of the Rome I-Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008).56 
These Regulations, however, were not based on the internal market 
competence of the E.U., but on its provisions of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters, which are limited to cross-border disputes under now 
Art. 81(2) of the TFEU.57 The same is true of the Regulation (EC) No. 
861/2007 of 11 July 2007 on a European Small Claims Procedure.58 
Why this sudden extension of ADR procedures to consumer 
arbitration? How does this extension relate to the seemingly 
contradictory statement in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, which 
reads: “This Directive acknowledges the competence of Member 
States to determine whether ADR entities established on their 
territories are to have power to impose a solution.”?59 An additional 
reservation is made in Recital (20) whereby an “out-of-court procedure 
which is created on an ad hoc basis for a single dispute between a 
consumer and a trader should not be considered as an ADR 
procedure.”60 This excludes the commercial practice of setting up 
                                                 
54   Commission Recommendation 98/257, of 30 March 1998 on the 
Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of 
Consumer Disputes 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31; Reich, supra note 1, ¶ 8.19, 8.22. 
55   Commission Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1; 
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 
O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).  
56   Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (“Rome I”), 2008 
O.J. (L 176) 6. 
57   TFEU art. 81(2). 
58   Council Regulation 861/2007, of 11 July 2007 on a European Small 
Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1. 
59   Directive 2013/11, art. 2(4).  
60   Id. at Preamble Directive 20. 
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special arbitration panels for more complex individual disputes as an 
option for consumer arbitration falling under Directive 2013/11. 
IV. A FIRST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE CONUNDRUM ON 
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CREATED BY DIRECTIVE 2013/11 
Dir. 2013/11 shows a certain contradiction concerning 
consumer arbitration: Member States are free to set it up, to continue 
existing instruments, or to completely abstain from doing so. If, 
however, Member States take an active view toward consumer 
arbitration, they are bound by the requirements of Directive 2013/11 
in general, and Articles 10 and 11 in particular, which will be discussed 
in greater detail later in Sections VII and IX. 
Article 10 and 11 only apply in cases where the plaintiff 
consumer is bound by an arbitration agreement, not if the trader 
himself initiates a claim in arbitration.61 According to Article 2(1) and 
(2)(c) it is limited to actions in contract (with the exception of non-
economic services of general interest), and excludes actions in tort and 
restitution with some doubts concerning borderline cases not to be 
discussed here. Injunctions against illegal behavior of traders sought 
by consumer associations are also excluded; they come under other 
E.U. law instruments, in particular Directive 2009/22/EU on 
injunctions.62 
The principles contained in Directive 2013/11 are obviously 
minimum requirements under Art. 2(3). Within these limits, Member 
States are free to regulate consumer arbitration, e.g., regarding 
competence, costs, choice of arbitrators, etc. This is part of Member 
States’ so-called “procedural autonomy,” which has been recognized 
by the CJEU as a general principle of E.U. law.63 On the other hand, 
                                                 
61   If the trader initiates a claim in arbitration, Directive 2013/11 is not 
applicable.   See Directive 2013/11, art. 2(2)(g). 
62   Directive 2009/22, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests (recast), 
2009 O.J. (L 110) 30. 
63   For an overview see REICH, supra note 5, ¶ 4.4; Norbert Reich, Hans-
W. Micklitz, Peter Rott and Klaus Tonner, Negotiation and Adjudication – Class Actions 
and Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW ¶ 8.3 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
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Member States must respect the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence, which are now part of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights—a subject matter to be discussed in Section XI.  
V. THE LIMITS OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION: CLARO AND 
ASTURCOM 
In Claro,64 the CJEU goes quite far in the degree to which the 
national court of an E.U. Member State must engage in investigations 
on its own motion in arbitration proceedings.65 When the consumer 
has agreed to an arbitration clause—the unfairness of which must be 
determined by national law, as could be seen from clause 1(q) of the 
Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/1366—the consumer still 
cannot be drawn into arbitration against his will if this clause may be 
regarded as unfair. Annex 1 reads:  
Terms that may be regarded as unfair . . . 
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take 
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, 
particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes 
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to 
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, 
according to the applicable law, should lie with another 
party to the contract.67 
The unfairness may also be invoked against traditional principle of the 
law of arbitration on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator and not 
the national court having jurisdiction to determine the unfairness. 
                                                 
64   Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R. 
I-10421.  
65   Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and the Sleeping Beauty – 
The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 771 
(2014). 
66   Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
67   Id.  
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In Asturcom, the CJEU quite adroitly used the principle of 
“equivalence” to guarantee a sort of “last resort” protection to the 
consumer: if national law allows the reopening of arbitration 
proceedings on the basis of public policy, the judge must consider the 
defenses available under E.U. consumer protection provisions which 
take the place of public policy.68 Advocate General Trstenjak, who is 
in line with the Hungarian and the Spanish Governments69 as well as 
the European Commission,70 went even further in arguing that 
effective consumer protection requires the removal of res judicata in 
execution proceedings.71 
The facts in Claro and Asturcom are somewhat different, as the 
consumer was drawn into arbitration proceedings by the trader that 
contained arbitration clauses. Directive 2013/11 expressly excludes 
this situation where the trader, not the consumer, takes his case to an 
entity that administers ADR. However, it seems that the principles 
developed in Claro and Asturcom can be generalized, especially 
concerning their challenges to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine.  
Such a situation could arise under Directive 2013/11 where the 
consumer takes his complaint to a court of law, and the trader invokes 
the arbitration clause as a defense72 to compel arbitration, provided the 
arbitration clause meets the requirements of Article 10 after the 
implementation of the Directive. The situation in Asturcom where a 
final arbitration award against a consumer can be challenged only 
under the limited requirements of the public policy (ordre public) 
                                                 
68   Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera, 
2009 E.C.R. I-9579. The extension of the public policy concept to “mere” mandatory 
law has remained controversial in doctrine. See the skeptical remarks by Vanessa 
Mak, Harmonisation through “Directive Related” Case Law: the Role of the ECJ in the 
Development of European Consumer Law 136-37 (Tilburg Inst. of Comparative & 
Transnational Law, Working Paper No. 2008/8, 2008); Mak, supra note 4, at 446. See 
also BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 32 (insisting on the difference between “public 
policy” and “public interest”: “consumer protection is associated with public interest; 
it is not subject to public policy). This distinction between public interest and public 
policy seems artificial and cannot be maintained under E.U. law autonomous 
interpretation principles. 
69   See Hungarian and Spanish Gov’t. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).  
70   See European Com. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).  
71   Advocate Gen.  Trstenjak in Asturcom, supra note 4, at 58 et seq. 
72   “Schiedseinrede” in German. See Section XII, infra. 
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provision must be reshaped under the effectiveness test and not merely 
under the equivalence principle. This discussion illustrates that 
Directive 2013/11 does not address the real problems of consumer 
arbitration, and that the gaps left by E.U.-legislation must therefore be 
amended by recourse to general principles of E.U. law, namely the 
principle of effective legal protection.73 
VI. WHAT ABOUT CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE 
BRUSSELS MECHANISM OF JURISDICTION? 
A consumer who wishes to have his claim against a trader 
located in another E.U. country arbitrated cannot rely on the 
jurisdiction of his home country, as would be the case under the 
Brussels regime. Directive 2013/11 does not contain rules on 
jurisdiction in cross-border conflicts, nor does it refer to the Brussels 
regime in a similar way as Art. 11 to the consumer protective 
provisions of Art. 6 of the Rome I-Regulation 593/2008 (see Section 
IX, infra). 
Art. 7(1)(a) only requires ADR-entities to “make publicly 
available on their websites . . . clear and easily understandable 
information on . . . their contact details, including postal address and 
e-mail address.”74 This provision—including the submission of claims 
online75—may be acceptable for optional complaint handling, but not 
for arbitration which may “impose solutions” to consumers. The 
impact of the risk to the consumer to lose his case is much more far-
reaching because of the binding nature of the (non-)award by the 
arbitrator. 
Article 15(1) lit c) of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (Article 
17(1) lit c) Regulation 1215/2012) provides that the consumer may sue 
the trader either at the trader’s place of domicile or at the business seat 
if “the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues 
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that 
                                                 
73   For further discussion of the principle of effective legal protection, see 
Section XI, infra. 
74   Council Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(a). 
75   Council Directive 2013/11, art. 5(2)(a). 
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Member State or several States including that Member State.”76 There 
has been intense debate concerning this provision due to the issues 
raised by e-commerce, since the provision may be interpreted in such 
a way that the mere accessibility of the website of a company situated 
in one Member State by a consumer domiciled in another Member 
State may give such consumer the right to sue the company in the 
consumer’s domicile—a result which makes marketing by e-commerce 
subject to different and divergent jurisdictions. Therefore, the CJEU 
in Pammer distinguished between the mere accessibility of a website, 
which does not qualify as “directing activities,” and a non-exclusive list 
of criteria for determining “directing activities” where such a 
qualification is possible and must be established by competent national 
courts.77 The trader may avoid being subject to multiple jurisdictions 
by making clear his intention to market his product or service only in 
certain countries to the exclusion of others, or by not making available 
his website in those excluded countries. 
Jurisdiction clauses are regulated by Article 17 of Regulation 
44/2001 resp. Article 19 of Regulation 1215/2012.78 The rationale 
behind this provision is that such clauses in consumer contracts cannot 
be enforced before the litigation has commenced. A consumer does 
not lose privileged access to courts under Articles 15 and 16 by the 
jurisdiction clause.79 This is in contrast to the general rule in Article 23 
(Article 25 of Regulation 1215/2012), which allows jurisdiction clauses 
to be enforced if entered into in writing or by electronic means.80 
However, Article 23 is not applicable to consumer arbitration. 
                                                 
76   Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
art. 15(1)(c), 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC). 
77   Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer et al. v. Reederei 
Karl Schlüter et al., 2010 E.C.R. I-12527; Eva-Maria Kieninger, Grenzenloser 
Verbraucherschutz?, in LIBER AMICORUM U. MAGNUS 449, 455 (2014) (interpreting 
“direct activities” as “activity directed at a certain objective” (“Zielgerichtete Tätigkeit”)). 
78   Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
art. 17, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC). 
79    Id. art. 15-16. 
80  Id. art. 23; see also Case C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub v 
CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, [2015] W.L.R.(D) 222.   
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The gap left by the—insufficient—provisions on consumer 
arbitration in Directive 2013/11 must be filled by reference to the 
general fairness standards as developed under Directive 93/13, which 
will be discussed in Section IX. In my opinion, no difference should 
be made whether the action is brought by the consumer or the trader, 
or whether the two are joined in a single case. 
VII. THE “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE” OF THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT BY THE CONSUMER 
The most important provision for consumer protection in 
Directive 2013/11 follows the classical paradigm of the “informed EU 
consumer.”81 Article 10 explicitly requires specific acceptance by the 
consumer for arbitration clauses in consumer to business (C2B) 
disputes, which may be extended by Member States both horizontally 
to a business to consumer (B2C) conflict and vertically by imposing 
additional requirements on this specific acceptance. Article 10 reads: 
(1) Member States shall ensure that an agreement 
between a consumer and a trader to submit complaints 
to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it 
was concluded before the dispute has materialised and 
if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of his 
right to bring an action before the courts for the 
settlement of the dispute. 
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures 
which aim at resolving a dispute by imposing a solution 
the solution imposed may be binding on the parties 
only if they were informed of its binding nature in 
advance and specifically accepted this. Specific 
acceptance by the trader is not required if national rules 
provide that solution are binding on traders.82 
                                                 
81   See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 92 (2d 
ed. 2013); HANS W. MICKLITZ ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW ¶ 1.35 
(2d ed. 2013). 
82   Directive 2013/11, art. 10. 
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It seems as though the intention of the E.U.-legislator was to 
exclude pre-dispute arbitration clauses, which are common in the 
U.S.83 The wording of Art. 10(1) refers to a “dispute” having 
“materialised.”84 Before that event, the clause would not be binding on 
the consumer. Can the same strict interpretation of this concept of 
non-binding be applied similar to Article 6 of the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCC) 93/13 where, according to 
case law of the CJEU, the court must ex officio disapply the unfair 
contract term?85 This will have to be decided by the CJEU, but such 
analogy seems reasonable given the similarity of the formulation in 
Article 6 of the UTCC and Directive 2013/11. 
Under a strict literal construction of Article 10, there is no 
“dispute” to be resolved before the conclusion of a contract. This is 
only the case once consumer complaints arise during contract 
execution. Consumer arbitration clauses therefore only operate once a 
specific dispute has arisen between the trader and the consumer. Both 
parties may have good reasons to take their conflict to arbitration, e.g., 
because of the speed or lower costs of getting a (binding) decision, but 
the consumer should not be forced to do so before a “dispute has 
materialised.”86 
What does “specific acceptance” mean? Recital 4387 does not 
provide an answer. A similar provision, however, is contained in 
Article 8(2) of the Draft Regulation of a Common European Sales Law 
(CESL), which requires an “explicit statement which is separate from 
the statement indicating the agreement to conclude a contract.”88 This 
statement may be concluded in electronic form, but the trader must 
notify the consumer of its binding nature on a durable medium, e.g., a 
                                                 
83   According to BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 385, this was not the case 
with EU law before Dir. 2013/11. 
84   Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1). 
85   See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66 at 780.  
86   Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1). 
87   Recital 43 of the Preamble to Directive 2013/11.  
88   Comission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
mof the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, art. 8(2), 
(Oct. 22, 2011); Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Too Broad or not Broad Enough?  29 
(LAW, EUI Working Papers No. 4, 2012). 
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mere hyperlink would not be enough.89 On the other hand, the 
statement must be clearly separated from the contract terms, even if it 
is contained in a “term not . . . individually negotiated” according to 
Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13.90 A mere button solution, or so called 
“click-wrap clauses,”91 which are popular in U.S. licensing agreements, 
are not acceptable in E.U. law, which in Article 10(2) of Directive 
2013/11 has set a minimum standard not to be undermined by 
Member States’ law. 
“Specific acceptance” has imposed an E.U. standard, subject 
to CJEU’s interpretation. However, under Guy Denuit, an arbitration 
panel or ADR-entity authorized to “impose” solutions cannot make 
reference to the CJEU under Article 267 of the TFEU.92 This 
paradoxical result warrants a critical assessment of the traditional rule 
of (commercial) arbitration that the arbitrator, not the court, has 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz concerning the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, at least in consumer matters, to be scrutinized under 
fundamental rights aspects later discussed in Section XII. 
Since the requirements for “specific acceptance” in Article 3(2) 
of Directive 2013/11 are minimal, Member States can increase these 
requirements, e.g., by requiring written form or signature requirements, 
or can limit the scope of arbitration clauses, e.g., by prohibiting them 
for certain risky financial transactions93 or imposing a financial cap on 
                                                 
89   Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd. v. Bundesarbeitskammer, 2011 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 660 (Feb. 3, 2011). 
90   Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, art. 3(2) 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
91   Click-wrap clauses are defined as “another form of creating an 
electronic agreement, except that the license is included on the computer screen 
before installation rather than on the box. By clicking on a button that says “I agree” 
or “I accept,” the licensee agrees to the terms of use of the contract. An important 
difference between click-wrap agreements and shrink-wrap agreements is the fact 
that the user actually has an opportunity to read the contract before using or installing 
the program.” See Reich, A ‘Trojan Horse’ in the access to Justice? – Party Autonomy and 
cOnusmer Arbitration in Conflict in the ADR-Directive 2013/11/EU? supra note 1, and 
now Case C-322/14 Jaoud El Majdoub v CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, 
[2015] W.L.R.(D) 222.. 
92   Case C-125/04, Guy Denuit et al v. Transorient voyages et Culture SA 
2005 E.C.R. I-925. 
93   This was done in Germany. See the discussion infra Section XII. 
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their use.94 Member States can also introduce rules on territorial or 
local jurisdiction, which are not precluded by the Brussels regime not 
applicable to arbitration. 
VIII. E.U. STANDARDS BEYOND “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE” 
The above-mentioned Claro and Asturcom cases did not 
concern the validity of the arbitration agreement, but left this issue to 
applicable Member States. This will change once Directive 2013/11 is 
implemented by Member States into their national law, which should 
occur by July 9, 2015. Can E.U. unfair terms legislation be applied 
beyond the mere information model95 of Directive 2013/11? Would a 
national court be required to control ex officio under the unfairness test 
arbitration clauses, which impose substantial inconveniences on the 
consumer since arbitration is likely to result in excessive costs or will 
force the consumer to take the case to an ADR-entity far away from 
his residence (similar to the Bragg case)? It is well-known that E.U. law 
is strict in banning jurisdiction clauses which force the consumer to 
take his case to a court away from his habitual residence resulting in a 
de facto denial of access to justice.96 On the other hand, the trader may 
have an efficiency interest to concentrate arbitration proceedings at his 
place of business. 
Article 3(1)97 is not clear on how a possible relationship 
between Directive 2013/11 and Directive 93/13 can be reconciled. 
The provision is only concerned with “conflicts,” not with additional 
requirements imposed by national law under the minimum protection 
clause,98 even if based on CJEU practice obliging Member States’ 
courts to control ex officio the fairness of pre-formulated contract terms. 
If the “specific acceptance” is contained in such a pre-formulated (yet 
separate) term, it is therefore subject to the ex officio control doctrine of 
the CJEU. Much will depend on the circumstances of the arbitration 
                                                 
94   This was done by the U.K. See the discussion infra Section XV. 
95   See Reich et al, supra note 65, ¶ 1.11.  
96  See Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. V. Ferenc Schneider 2010 
E.C.R. I-847; Wulf-Henning Roth, Case 137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lizing Zrt v Ferenc 
Schneider,7 Eur. Rev. Contract L. 425 (2011); Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66, at 789. 
97   See Directive 2013/11.  
98  Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, art. 8 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).  
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agreement. The main issue will always be whether the agreement makes 
the enforcement of consumer rights easier and less burdensome, which 
is the very objective of Directive 2013/11 under Article 1. In other 
words, the issue is whether such agreement puts additional constraints 
on the consumer’s enforcement of his rights under E.U. and national 
law that contradict the fairness criteria of Article 3 of Directive 93/13. 
It cannot be presumed that Article 3(1) Directive 2013/11 intended to 
preclude the unfairness test as a general standard of E.U. civil law. 
An open question remains as to how cross-border arbitration 
clauses can be controlled under the unfairness concept. As a general 
rule, arbitration is exempted from the applicability of Regulation 
44/2001, Article 1(2) lit d). On the other hand, the effect of jurisdiction 
clauses in consumer contracts has been severely limited by the 
Regulation. Should these principles be applied per analogiam under the 
unfairness standard to arbitration clauses, which may have a similar 
effect on the consumer’s right to have his case heard in his home 
jurisdiction if the conditions of Article 17 of Regulation 44/2001(in 
the future: Article 19 Regulation 1215/2012) are met? There is indeed 
no reason to argue against such analogy because, for the consumer, it 
does not make any difference whether the denial of his home 
jurisdiction before litigation is effected through a jurisdiction or 
arbitration clause.99 The exemption of arbitration from the scope of 
application of the Brussels instruments is intended to privilege 
commercial arbitration, but not to deprive the consumer of his right 
to a defense and a fair hearing. This reasoning limits the use of 
arbitration clauses in cross-border contracting. 
IX. APPLICABLE LAW: (LIMITED) FREE CHOICE BY ARBITRATORS 
OR RESERVATION OF MANDATORY PROVISIONS? 
Under traditional arbitration law, in particular in commercial 
matters, the parties are free to determine the applicable law, including 
commercial usages or principles of equity. Article 7(1)(i) of the 
Directive 2013/11 put this problem under the heading of 
“transparency” for all ADR entities, including consumer arbitration: 
                                                 
99 Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 45. 
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Member States shall ensure that ADR entities make 
publicly available on their websites, on a durable 
medium . . ., and by any other means they consider 
appropriate, clear and easily understandable 
information on . . . the types of rules the ADR entity 
may use as a basis for the dispute resolution (for 
example legal provisions, considerations of equity, 
codes of conduct).100 
In addition, Article 6(1)(a) provides that the arbitrator need not 
be a lawyer or a person trained in law, but should at least have a 
“general understanding of law.”101 These are minimum standards, 
which can be enhanced by Member State laws on consumer 
arbitration, e.g., by restricting the reference to equity or codes of 
conduct or by demanding that arbitrators have legal training. The 
application of mandatory provisions of consumer law is regulated by 
provisions on “legality” in Article 11. Article 11 concerns two 
situations: (a) purely internal situations where mandatory consumer 
law provisions must be applied, even if parties expressly opted out in 
the contract; and (b) cross-border disputes where the rules on 
applicable law in Regulation 593/2008102 are normally excluded for 
arbitration agreements. Article 11 (1)(a)-(b) provides: 
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures 
which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing a 
solution on the consumer: (a) in a situation where there 
is no conflict of laws, the solution imposed shall not 
result in the consumer being deprived of the protection 
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of 
the Member State where the consumer and the trader 
are habitually resident, (b) in a situation involving 
conflict of laws, where the law applicable to the sales 
or service contract is determined in accordance with 
Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008, 
the solution imposed by the ADR entity shall not result 
                                                 
100   Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(i). 
101   Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
102  Commission Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (providing 
regulations on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)). 
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in the consumer being deprived of the protection 
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of 
the Member State in which he is habitually resident.103 
This provision will be welcomed by E.U. lawyers if compared 
with the traditional arbitration principles contained in U.S. law where 
the arbitrator can be exempted from applying mandatory provisions, 
and where legality control is only possible in final recognition 
proceedings under a narrow ordre public and related concepts.104 
Although the CJEU has tried to extend this concept to mandatory E.U. 
law both in commercial105 and consumer106 disputes, case law has 
remained unsettled and may not cover the entire scope of mandatory 
E.U. consumer law. It also comes late after the entire arbitration 
proceedings have been terminated, and it requires additional activity 
(and costs!) by the consumer. 
In my opinion, the legality requirement of consumer 
arbitration can only be fulfilled if Member States grant a remedy to the 
consumer to challenge an incorrect application of mandatory 
provisions by the arbitrator. The following situations may arise: 
 The consumer (or a group of consumers) brings a claim 
against the trader before a court of law, but the trader 
falsely invokes the arbitration agreement (the so-called 
Schiedseinrede). 
 The claim of the consumer is rejected (or reduced) by the 
arbitrator based on a false application of mandatory 
consumer law against Article 11 of Directive 2013/11; the 
consumer wants to challenge this rejection before a court 
of law, which may be impossible under existing arbitration 
legislation. 
                                                 
103   Citation to the quoted provision. 
104   See discussion of U.S. law supra Section I. 
105   See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l N.V., 
1999 E.C.R. I-3055.  
106   See Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomm. v. Rodrígues Noguera, 2009 
E.C.R. I-9579.  
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In practice, the most frequent situation is concerned with the 
trader—particularly in a long-term contract—using the arbitration 
mechanism to adjudicate his claims, as in Claro and Asturcom. These 
situations, however, are not covered by Directive 2013/11. 
A fundamental rights analysis will help to resolve these 
situations to avoid the fact that arbitration clauses are sometimes 
abused, as in the U.S., by traders to restrict consumers’ access to class 
claims for their individual claims. Section XI will provide a further 
discussion of the fundamental rights analysis. 
X. “SOFT” LEGAL PROTECTION 
Article 8 of Directive 2013/11 also contains some protective 
provisions. However, Article 8 does not have the force of law, and 
instead provides standards for good ADR practice subject to the 
monitoring and reporting requirements in Article 20: 
the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a 
nominal fee for consumers, lit (c); and 
the outcome of the ADR procedure is made available 
within a period of ninety calendar days from the date 
of which the ADR entity received the complete 
complaint file. In the case of highly complex disputes, 
the ADR entity in charge may, at its own discretion, 
extend the ninety calendar day time period. The parties 
shall be informed of any extension of that period and 
of the expected length of time that will be needed for 
the conclusion of the dispute.107 
These standards are standards flexible formulations applicable 
to consumer arbitration. Member States have discretion as to whether 
and how they implement them. Article 20 contains basic rules for 
sound ADR systems as an alternative to going to court and provide for 
inexpensive and quick adjudication. If practice in one Member State 
shows that this objective cannot be obtained by the existing consumer 
arbitration mechanism, it would be unfair to force the consumer to 
                                                 
107  Directive 2013/11, art. 20. 
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refer his claims to such arbitration even if the standards of “specific 
acceptance” under Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 are met. Of 
course, the requirements in Article 20 can be used as recommendations 
on how to interpret Member State law implementing E.U. law under 
the Grimaldi doctrine.108 
XI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: DIRECTIVE 2013/11 
ARTICLE 47 CHARTER 
The constitutional dimension of ADR proceedings has been 
expressly included in Recital 61 of Directive 2013/11, which reads: 
“[t]his Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and specifically Articles 7, 8, 38 and 47 
thereof.” 
Recital 45 refers to Article 47 concerning access to courts of 
law—a principle reiterated in Article 12(1) of Directive 2013/11.109 
This conforms to Alassini, which concerns a requirement in Italian law 
for consumer complaints against telecommunication operators to first 
make use of ADR/ODR proceedings, as foreseen in Directive 
2002/22,110 before going to court.111 The Court discussed this 
requirement, considering both the equivalence and the effectiveness 
principle, but did not find a violation of either principle. At the same 
time, the CJEU insisted on the consumer’s right to take his case to 
court: 
Nor do the principles of equivalence and effectiveness or the 
principle of effective judicial protection preclude national legislation 
which imposes, in respect of such disputes, prior implementation of 
an out-of-court settlement procedure, provided that that procedure 
does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it 
does not cause a substantial delay for the purposes of bringing legal 
                                                 
108  Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989 
E.C.R. I-4497. This case involves the indirect relevance of Commission 
recommendations in interpreting E.U. or national law.  
109   Id. at recital 45, art. 12(1). 
110  Directive 2002/22, Universal Service Directive, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51 
(EC). 
111   Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia, 2009 E.C.R. I-2214. 
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proceedings, that it suspends the period for the time-barring of claims 
and that it does not give rise to costs – or gives rise to very low costs 
– for the parties, and only if electronic means is not the only means by 
which the settlement procedure may be accessed and interim measures 
are possible in exceptional cases where the urgency of the situation so 
requires.112 
Alassini concerned ADR proceedings, which could only 
“propose,” not “impose,” solutions on the consumer. The wording of 
the decision, however, certainly shows hostility against ADR 
proceedings resulting in unreviewable and binding decisions. This 
wording—even though not discussed in detail in the judgment itself—
is inconsistent with the traditional principles of arbitration under the 
New York Convention, namely that the arbitrator has the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz to decide whether he has adjudicatory authority over the 
case, and that an award can usually only be refused recognition on the 
very narrow ground of “public policy (ordre public),” excluding the non-
observance of mandatory rules of procedure or substantive consumer 
protection. 
Can these traditional principles of arbitration law be upheld 
under the rules of consumer arbitration as provided by Directive 
2013/11, particularly Articles 10 and 11? I do not think so. This 
directive is also concerned with a specific aspect of the 
constitutionalization of civil law, namely, the principle of effectiveness 
of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter, which provides: “[e]veryone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance 
with the conditions laid down in this Article.”113 
Article 19(1) of the TEU puts the responsibility for “providing 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by Union law” on Member States through the status of their 
courts of law as “Union courts.”114 The agreement to arbitrate, as a 
private matter decided by parties, cannot waive the constitutional 
                                                 
112   Id. ¶ 67. 
113   Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, Dec. 
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.  
114   Treaty on the European Union, Dec. 7, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
320 
requirements of effective legal protection by access to national courts 
of law. The remedies, which are provided indirectly by arbitration 
concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, do not suffice to 
fulfill these constitutional requirements of E.U. law. The consumer 
must always have the possibility to challenge a decision of the 
arbitrator even if he has in principle agreed to the arbitration 
proceedings by respecting Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 or an 
equivalent national provision. Agreement by “specific acceptance” 
does not mean a total preclusion of the right to effective legal 
protection, which the national judge must guarantee under the ex-officio 
doctrine. Under the “remedial function” of Article 47 of the E.U. 
Charter and Article 19(1)(2) of the TEU,115 Member States must 
establish remedies protecting the legitimate interests of the consumer 
that ensure that the mandatory requirements of consumer arbitration 
are met.116 The freedom of Member States to regulate consumer 
arbitration under Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11 should be limited 
by the fundamental rights protected by E.U. law. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that: 
 The validity of an arbitration agreement both from a formal 
and a substantive view is ultimately a matter to be decided 
by courts, not the arbitrator. 
 In consumer arbitration, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz belongs to 
the competent court, not the arbitrator. 
 Decisions of the arbitrator to reject or limit a claim of the 
consumer under Directive 2013/11 can be challenged 
before courts of law, in particular in case of breach or non-
observance of mandatory provisions. 
 The national judge hearing a case involving consumer 
arbitration must ex officio apply the mandatory provisions of 
E.U. and national law, even if not raised by the consumer. 
                                                 
115   See REICH, supra note 5, at 4-10. 
116   Id. (this seems to be recognized by the Court in Claro and Asturcom, 
even though not based on Article 47 of the E.U. Charter or Article 19 of the TEU, 
which were not in force at the time of decisions, but rather the traditional principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence). 
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 The scope of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 
19(1)(2) of the TEU is not limited to arbitration under 
Directive 2013/11, but can be extended to any consumer 
arbitration, in particular in cases brought by the trader 
against the consumer before an arbitrator (B2C—the 
Claro/Asturcom situations). 
XII. IMPACT OF DIRECTIVE 2013/11 ON MEMBER STATE LAW ON 
CONSUMER ARBITRATION IN GERMANY 
The German law on arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts117 begins with a “form model” of consumer protection.118 
Sections 1029 and 1031 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO, Code on Civil 
Procedure), as amended in 1997, allow arbitration clauses if they have 
been documented sufficiently well. Arbitration agreements which 
involve consumers “must be contained in a document signed by the 
parties themselves.”119 The signature of an agent is not enough.120 The 
written form can be substituted by the electronic form according to 
Section 126a of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB, Civil Code), as 
amended.121 The written or electronic document may not contain any 
other contractual clauses. Germany has not made any reservation 
under the New York Convention of 1958 to exclude consumer 
contracts. Therefore, the legal regime for arbitration in Germany is the 
                                                 
117   See generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI 
CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 73 
(2012) (explaining the German “arbitration” system, but is more concerned with 
conciliation and mediation (Schlichtung in German), not with binding arbitration as 
understood here); Norbert Reich, Consumer ADR in Europe: Civil Justice Systems, 50 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 913 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR, 
& NAOMI CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS (2012)).  
118   WEIHE, supra note 8, at 155-58. 
119   ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 
30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 1031(5) (Ger.) 
[hereinafter ZPO]. 
120   Id. 
121  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 126a (Ger.). 
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same whether or not a consumer is part of an arbitration agreement 
meeting the form requirements.122 
The provision in Section 1031(5) of the ZPO is similar to 
Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11,123 although the latter does not 
require signature or an electronic equivalent. However, Article 2(3) of 
Directive 2013/11 allows Member States to impose more stringent 
provisions on consumer arbitration,124 including a requirement that the 
document should only contain clauses concerning the arbitration 
agreement as such. German law does not use the term “specific 
acceptance,” but it seems that this is exactly what is meant by the 
German legislature in an E.U.-conforming interpretation. It is obvious 
that the arbitration agreement must be separated from other contract 
clauses; however, there is no prior notification requirement which 
must be included in the arbitration document. 
Concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, German 
law contains a compromise solution somewhat different from 
Directive 2013/11. Under Section 1032(1) of the ZPO, the arbitration 
agreement precludes any action before a court of law (Schiedseinrede in 
German), unless it is “void, ineffective or inoperative” (nichtig, 
unwirksam oder undurchführbar).125 However, this “Schiedseinrede” must 
be expressly raised by the defendant before oral proceedings in court. 
This provision is not in line with the case law of the CJEU, which 
requires an ex officio intervention of the court who does not have to 
wait for an action of the consumer.126 
On the other hand, Section 37h of the WpHG 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, law on securities transactions), as amended, 
restricts arbitration clauses concluded before litigation to persons 
acting in commerce (“Kaufleute”) and legal persons of public law, thus 
excluding consumer transactions in investment services from 
                                                 
122   Jürgen Samtleben, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei 
grenzüberschreitenden Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES 
PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 974, 975 (1999) (Ger.). 
123   ZPO, § 1031(5).  
124   Directive 2013/11, art. 2(3). 
125   ZPO, ¶ 1032(1). 
126   REICH, supra note 5, ¶¶ 4, 16. 
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arbitration clauses.127 Its legislative rationale is controversial128 and 
beyond the scope of this paper. According to an earlier opinion of 
Samtleben,129 the WpHG’s international sphere of application is 
determined by the normal place of residence of the private investor. If 
the place of residence is Germany, the arbitration clause is not 
effective, and the consumer will be able to take his claim to the courts 
of his country of residence according to Articles 15 and 16 of 
Regulation 44/2001 (Article 17 and 18 of Regulation 1215/2012). The 
arbitration clause prohibition contained in Section 37h of the WpHG 
is consistent with the general power of Member States to regulate 
consumer arbitration in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, including 
prohibiting it with regard to certain transactions (investment services). 
This prohibition is also enforceable against a foreign arbitration 
agreement, which need not be respected by the German judex a quo 
under the provision concerning the application of “overriding 
mandatory provisions” under Article 9 of Rome I-Reg.130 
This rather liberal and generous approach to arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts (with the exception of investment services) 
taken by the ZPO was confirmed by the German Bundesgerichtshof 
(BGH) with regard to the admissibility arbitration clauses under the 
special legislation on unfair contract terms, now included in the 
                                                 
127   Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Law on Securities Transactions], 
Sep. 9, 1998, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 1842, as amended, § 37h (Ger.). 
128   For different views on German legal literature, see Rolf Sethe, § 37h 
WpHG (Schiedsabreden), in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) ¶ 7, (Heinz-Dieter 
Assmann & Uwe H.Schneider eds., 6th ed. 2012) (examining “excessive investor 
protection”); Rainer Hausmann, Schiedsvereinbaraungen, in INTERNATIONALES 
VERTRAGSRECHT ¶ 3469 (Christoph Reithmann & Dieter Martiny eds., 7th Ed. 
2014); Jürgen Samtleben, Das Börsentermingeschäft ist tot – es lebe das Finanztermingeschäft?, 
15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht  69, 76 (2003)  (taking a more neutral 
approach). Compare WEIHE, supra note 8, at 141 (arguing that § 37h WpHG expresses 
a general principle of consumer protection), with Klaus Peter Berger, 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Finanztermingeschäfte – Der “Schutz” der Anleger vor der 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit durch § 37h WpHG, 15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht 77, 
85 (2003) (taking a more liberal approach). The author agrees with Weihe because of 
the particular risks of transactions for the consumer covered by this provision, which 
may not be adequately addressed by the arbitrator. 
129   WEIHE, supra note 8, at 77. 
130  See generally Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies 
(Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4306 
(Oct. 17, 2013) (interpreting Rome I-Reg). 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
324 
BGB.131 According to the BGH, an arbitration clause cannot impose 
an unfair disadvantage on the consumer.132 The consumer is protected 
by the form requirement of Section 1031(5) of the ZPO, which should 
warn him against the risk of an arbitration clause.133 It is, in the opinion 
of the BGH, not necessary that the user of the arbitration clause shows 
a special interest in it. Unlike jurisdiction clauses, arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts may be concluded before the dispute arises. The 
BGH also refers to Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the Annex of 
Directive 93/13,134 where arbitration clauses are only condemned if 
they concern disputes taken to arbitration “not covered by legal 
provisions;” the rules of the ZPO, in the opinion of the BGH, must 
be regarded as such provisions.135 The BGH also insists that the 
arbitration clause regulates access to arbitration in a fair and impartial 
manner.136 
Even if in the case before the BGH the arbitration clause may 
not have been unfair (the litigation concerned disputes involving losses 
out of a speculative investment scheme of about 125.000 euro), the 
judgment should not be generalized as allowing arbitration clauses in 
any type of consumer dispute if the mere form requirements of Section 
1031(5) of the ZPO are met. This is particularly true if the costs of 
arbitration are substantial in relation to the sum in litigation and 
amount to a de facto denial of justice. The same is true with regard to 
the choice of the arbitrator, which gives an unfair advantage to one 
party against the consumer.137 These questions will now have to be 
measured against the requirements set up in Articles 10 and 11 of 
Directive 2013/11 in the interpretation advanced in this paper (supra 
VII/VIII). The BGH may have to reconsider its liberal opinion 
towards arbitration clauses in future cases. 
                                                 
131   Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 10, 2005, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 1125, 2005 (Ger.); WEIHE, supra note 8, 
at 278. 
132   See id. 
133   WEIHE, supra note 8, at 187 (regarding existing German practices).  
134   Id. at 1127.  
135   Id. at 1127. 
136   Id. 
137   Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (OLGDü) [Higher Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf] June 1, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 400, 1996 
(Ger.). 
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XIII. THE SPANISH APPROACH 
As Claro shows, arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may 
be declared void by Member States according to the so-called 
indicative list,138 even though there is no formal obligation to do so.139 
This has been done in Spain. However, arbitration clauses in pre-
formulated consumer contracts are always possible where the dispute 
is referred to “arbitration bodies established by statutory provision in 
respect of a specific sector or circumstances.”140 Spanish Law has 
established a “Sistema Arbitral de Consumo” in Article 31 of the 
Consumer Protection Law of 1984, implemented by the Real Decreto 
636/1993, modified by Decreto 60/2003.141 It provides for arbitration 
panels (colegio arbitral) to be established by national and regional 
“Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo.”142 These panels are composed of a 
President (representing the competent administration), a consumer 
representative, and a business association representative. Hence, 
Spanish law prioritizes certain recognized consumer arbitration 
bodies143 to which the arbitrator “agreed to” by Ms. Claro in her 
dispute with a mobile telephone company did not belong. 
The Spanish system was modified by Real Decreto 231/2008, 
which defines the functions, composition, competences, and 
procedures of consumer arbitration boards.144 The use of the 
arbitration system is voluntary for the parties. First, an arbitration 
                                                 
138   Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts, Annex 1 lit. q, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
139   See Case C-478/99, Comm’n v. Sweden 2002 E.C.R. I-4147 ¶ 20. 
140   See Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies (Unamar) NV 
v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4306 (Oct. 17, 
2013).   
141   See MANUEL-ANGEL LOPEZ SANCHEZ ET AL., SERVICIOS 
FINANCIEROS, PROTECCION DEL CONSUMIDOR Y SISTEMAS EXTRAJUDICIALES DE 
RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS IN ESPAÑA 119-170 (1995); see also WEIHE, supra note 
8, at 119; Cavier Favre-Bulle, Arbitrage et règlement alternatif des litiges (ADR): une autre 
justice pour les consommateurs?, in DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION, LIBER AMICORUM 
BERND STAUDER 95, 113 (2006). 
142   LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, supra note 142, at 142-48. 
143   See Ewoud Hondius, Towards a European Small Claims Procedure?, in 
LIBER AMICORUM BERND STAUDER, 135 fn 36 (Luc Thévenoz & Norbert Reich, 
eds. 2006). 
144   HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 213. 
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request form must be filled out by a consumer, his lawyer, or a 
consumer association. This form requirement conforms to Article 
10(2) of Directive 2013/11. Usually the arbitration board correlates to 
the consumer’s residence. The use of arbitration is free of charge for 
both consumers and businesses, with the exception of discovery, and 
procedures usually do not take longer than six months. As with a court 
judgment, the parties can appeal an arbitration decision within two 
months. In addition, appeals can be brought based on decisions by the 
Junta Arbitral del Consumo to accept or reject requests for arbitration 
of consumer disputes. As an overall principle, Spanish law does not 
recognize the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, and therefore is 
consistent with the approach advanced in this paper based on Article 
47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19 of the TEU. 
The Spanish consumer arbitration system has created a second 
tier of legal protection for consumers and is similar to a court system, 
including the necessary guarantees of legality and effective legal 
protection. It could serve as a model for other E.U. countries wanting 
to implement the consumer arbitration provisions of Directive 
2013/11 in a way suggested in this paper. 
XIV. A REGULATED APPROACH: FRANCE 
According to French law, an arbitration clause (clause 
compromissoire) in a consumer contract is invalid and cannot be enforced 
against the consumer. This is derived from Article 2061 of the French 
Civil Code, modified by Law of 15.5.2001, whereby “la clause 
compromissoire est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une 
activité professionelle.”145 However, in cross-border transactions 
Article 2061 is not applicable, so the French Cour de Cassation146 has 
taken a more liberal approach. French scholars criticize this approach 
as “paradoxale” because the consumer enjoys less protection in cross-
border relations even though such relations are more dangerous. 
French scholars also refer to legislation on unfair contract terms, 
                                                 
145   HENRI TEMPLE & JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, DROIT DE LA 
CONSOMMATION ¶ 497 (9th ed., 2015) (“the arbitration clause is valid in a contract 
concluded because of a professional activity”). 
146   Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Jan. 5, 1999, Bull. Civ. I, no. 31 (Fr.). 
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namely to the above mentioned Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the 
Annex of Directive 93/13; this is interpreted as a blacklist, even though 
the French legislature formally did not go so far.147 This argument, 
however, was not considered by the ECJ in Claro.148 
It unclear whether and how French law will be modified in 
implementing Directive 2013/11. However, the prohibition of the 
arbitration clause in B2C contracts can be maintained according to 
Article 2(4) of Directive. 2013/11 since “[t]his Directive acknowledges 
the competence of Member States to determine whether ADR entities 
established on their territories are to have the power to impose a 
solution.”  
XV. A COMPROMISE: U.K. LAW 
U.K. law takes a nuanced approach to arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts. The Arbitration Acts of 1996 permit only a 
limited right of appeal from an arbitrator’s decision to courts of law.149 
In particular, clauses binding consumers in advance to arbitration for 
sums less than £5,000 are not allowed.150 The original provision under 
the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act of 1988 exempted “non 
domestic arbitration agreements” from the requirements of this rule; 
however, the Court of Appeal extended it to consumers from other 
E.C. countries to avoid a discrimination based on nationality.151 
Arbitration has been frequently included in Codes of Practice 
as a low cost dispute resolution scheme, but abuses of arbitration led 
to the 1996 Spanish arbitration law amendments, which imposed a cap 
on pre-formulated arbitration clauses. Therefore, ombudsmen 
                                                 
147   TEMPLE & CALAIS-AULOY, supra note 146, at 72. 
148   See generally Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1. 
149   GERAINT G. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW ¶ 14.7.1 (2d ed. 2005). 
150 Id. ¶ 13.9.5.2. (iv). 
151 Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei grenzüberschreitenden 
Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 981, ¶ 
14.6 (1998) (Ger.). 
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schemes152 are preferred because they are binding only on businesses 
and not on consumers.153 
The Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) has initiated 
a separate arbitration scheme,154 which is administered by CEDR-
solve.155 The arbitrator’s award is issued in writing and provides a 
summary of the facts, conclusions, and reasons for the decision. The 
arbitrator’s decision is legally binding on both parties and is 
enforceable directly through the courts. Any party can ask for a review 
of the arbitrator’s decision, on paying a non-reimbursable £ 350 review 
fee, although there are limited grounds on which this can be 
challenged.156 
XVI. STATE MONITORED ADR SYSTEMS WITHOUT BINDING 
ARBITRATION: SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES 
Most Scandinavian countries have taken a specific approach 
concerning the handling of consumer disputes, namely, by instituting 
state complaint boards in which business and consumer associations 
participate. This makes arbitration an out-of-court instrument of 
dispute settlement more or less superfluous. 
The institution of the Danish consumer complaint boards157 
may serve as a model. Article 8(3) of the Danish Lov om 
Forbrugerklagenoevnet of 1974/1988158 provides for a priority of 
proceedings before the complaint board—even if the matter is already 
in arbitration—if the consumer wants to take his complaint before the 
board. The consumer can take his complaint before the board at any 
                                                 
152   An ombudsman scheme is a voluntary ADR system set up by the 
industry and approved by the government.  
153   Howells & Weatherill, supra note 150, ¶ 14.6. 
154   See HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 328. 
155   Dispute Resolution Services, CEDR, 
http://www.cedr.com/solve/dispute-resolution-services/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).   
156   HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 331. 
157 Danish consumer complaint boards have been analyzed in detail by 
Jens M. Scherpe, Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegung, in VERBRAUCHERSACHEN (2002); the 
German translation of the law is at pages 285-289.  
158 Art. 8(3) Lov om Forbrugerklagenævnet (Lovebehendtgoerelse Nr. 282 
of 10.5.1988) (Den.). 
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time during the complaint proceedings; there is no time limit or other 
formal requirement. In this case, the arbitration proceedings will be 
staid until the board has handled the matter. This rule implies that 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are not void as such, but also 
do not preempt proceedings before the complaint board and thus 
avoid the limited remedies for the consumer against arbitration clauses 
in the above-mentioned “Einredesituation” under Article II(3) of the 
New York Convention of 1958 as a defense against an arbitration 
clause. 
A similar situation in Sweden concerning the Allmänna 
Reklamtionsnämnden (ARM) has been described in some detail in a study 
by this author on financial regulation in the E.U.159 As a result of the 
procedure, the ARM issues a written proposal for the settlement 
(beslut), which in most cases will be accepted by the parties. If the 
parties do not agree, they can take the case to court. 
The Scandinavian system is said to work well both in the 
interests of consumers and of business. It avoids lengthy court 
proceedings and reaches a high rate of successful settlements. 
XVII. A SEEMINGLY UNKNOWN EXPERIENCE: POLAND 
Poland has established—mostly before becoming member of 
the E.U. in 2004—a detailed arbitration system. Nevertheless, if we 
consider a recent paper of Polish scholar Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska, 
“the awareness of [the arbitration system’s] existence still reaches very 
few consumers.”160 There is a general scheme that “imposes” solutions 
upon traders and consumers alike. This scheme, which is administered 
by the State Trade Inspection, which has general jurisdiction in all 
consumer matters except those which are specifically excluded and 
must be submitted to specialized institutions. These excluded 
consumer matters are: 
                                                 
159 INSTITUTIONELLE FINANZMARKTAUFSICHT UND 
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (INSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION) 165 (Keßler, Micklitz, Reich eds. 2010). 
160   Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska, The Model of Consumer Arbitration Courts in 
Poland, INT. J. ON CONSUMER L.  & PRAC., 28, 39 (2013). 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
330 
 Permanent arbitration courts with the President of the 
Office of Electronic Communications concerning claims 
against telecom and postal operators. 
 The Arbitration Court at the Insurance Ombudsman 
handling disputes concerning insurance contracts and 
occupational pension schemes. 
 Consumer Banking Arbitration at the Polish Banking 
Association (the Banking Arbitrator) whose decisions are 
binding on banks, but not on consumers. 
There is no obligation for consumers to take their disputes to 
arbitration, unless a binding agreement has been concluded. This is 
determined by the general provisions of the Polish Civil Code (Article 
385(1), which has implemented the E.U. Directive 93/13 on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts.161 As Flaga-Gieruszynska writes: 
Thus, the status of consumer arbitration courts is 
determined on the one hand by the decision making 
act of a public authority . . . which is a unique situation 
with regard to arbitration, and on the other hand—the 
act of will of the parties, which is the foundation of the 
creation of arbitration courts (the arbitration clause). 
Without the latter, it is impossible to speak of the 
existence of forms of dispute resolution of a voluntary 
nature.162 
CONCLUSIONS 
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to 
controversy in many jurisdictions. U.S. law has strongly favored 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Even among law and 
economics scholars there is no disagreement that “indeed arbitration 
restricts access to lawsuits and recovery”. This is justified by law and 
economics scholarship because “it removes the disproportionate 
benefit (to the ‘sophisticated elite’) and thus eliminates a regressive 
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cross-subsidy.”163 It remains however an open question whether this 
supposed redistributive effect suffices to impose binding arbitration 
clauses on consumers. In my opinion this is not the case because denial 
of individual access to justice cannot be justified be overall efficiency 
arguments. 
As the overview of the law on consumer arbitration clauses in 
some (not all!) E.U. Member countries has shown, the situation is quite 
different; one may call it even rather “chaotic”. It ranges from a simple 
prohibition of such clauses (France) to their permission under certain 
procedural (Germany, Spain, Poland) or substantive limitations (UK), 
to state monitored ADR systems (Scandinavian countries) which are 
not formally binding on the consumer but have similar effects in 
practice. 
Directive 2013/11, if implemented by Member State legislation 
before 9 July 2015 (which does not seem to be the case anyhow!), has 
not brought about any consistent E.U. practice, unlike the U.S. Federal 
Arbitration Act. Following a more “access to justice” approach, E.U. 
law has taken a mixed and to some extent limited approach in including 
ADR entities that “impose” a solution in its recent ADR Directive 
2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop 
consumer arbitration schemes in Member States as a second route of 
access to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new and somewhat 
clandestine policy of the E.U. 
This paper therefore has insisted on some additional 
procedural guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become 
more popular among E.U. Member countries, even though Directive 
2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on 
“specific acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such 
additional protection seems to be Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in conjunction with Article 19(1) paragraph 2 of 
the TEU whereby Member States must “provide remedies sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection” of E.U. consumers.164 At the time 
of writing, Member States must wait to implement measures 
                                                 
163  Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Court: Economic Analysis, in 
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 447, 
458 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013).  
164   TEU, art. 19(1) ¶ 2. 
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concerning Directive 2013/11 and to make any final judgments as to 
their E.U.-law conformity and efficiency. This paper sought to provide 
some guidelines for this upcoming debate. 
 
